Sivusin tätä aihetta hiljan Scandinavian Journal of History-lehteen rustaamassani vaihtoehtohistoria-artikkelissa. Voin liittää tähän lyhyet (hah) sitaatit, ilman alaviitteitä.Emma-Liisa kirjoitti:Toisin kuin Klinge ja samoin kuin Häikiö, Englund katsoo siis, että autonomian aikana luodut instituutiot eivät olleet välttämättömiä kansallisuusaatteen synnylle Suomessa. Mutta kun Häikiön mielestä Suomen irtautuminen Ruotsista olisi sujunut rauhallisesti, koska näin tapahtui Norjan kohdalla, Englund ounastelee, että se olisi johtanut sotaan.
Kansallisuusaatteen syntymisestä, mikäli Suomi olisi pysynyt Ruotsin osana:
Häikiön väitteestä, miten Suomi olisi voinut irtautua Ruotsista rauhanomaisesti:"Meanwhile, assuming that the previously-mentioned peace treaty between Sweden and Russia in 1809 would have indeed preserved the pre-war borders, most of Finland would still remain an integral part of Sweden, with Gustav IV Adolf still as the King. The so-called ”Old Finland”, annexed by Russia already in 1721 and 1743, would continue to remain under Russian rule. This sustained partition of Finland, broadly comparable to the partition of Poland, would have obvious knock-on-effects on the development of Finnish national awareness in the 19th century. A likely outcome might be that the language-based Finnish nationalism would gain more strength on the Russian side of the border, turning the Old Finland into a ”Piedmont” of Finnish nationalism, acting as an example also for those parts of Finland still under Swedish rule. Under such conditions, the subsequent fennomania could possibly develop as a backlash to the previously-mentioned pan-Scandinavist movement.
Interestingly enough, some Finnish historians have been unable to imagine a situation where a Finnish nationalism could still develop under this kind of a situation; instead, their usual comments have suggested that Old Finland would inevitably become “russified”, while the rest of Finland would become “swedified”. Interpretations of this kind can perhaps be taken as an example that Finnish historians prefer to deliberately underestimate the historical viability of the Finnish nationalism, so that they themselves would not be accused of nationalist tendencies. Alternatively, these interpretations may be taken as an example of the enduring legacy of Johan Vilhelm Snellman and the tendency to view the state – in this case, the historical Grand-Duchy of Finland – as the absolute prerequisite for the development of nationalism and as the irreplaceable, paramount instrument in the building of the Finnish nation. Historically, however, ethnic nationalism managed to develop in Estonia, Latvia and even Lithuania on the normal 19th century trajectory, without any local state institutions and from a considerably less favourable base. It’s difficult to explain why exactly Finland would have been an exception to the rule, even if the country had remained divided between Sweden and Russia."
"As one might expect, when attempting to speculate on what might have happened, even a professional historian can easily make an elementary mistake. One such example would be the counterfactual argument posed by historian Martti Häikiö, attempting to prove that a continued Swedish rule would have been more politically favourable for the 19th century Finland than the historical Russian rule. Häikiö supports his argument by pointing to the historically liberal, politically relaxed atmosphere which Sweden enjoyed after the introduction of the Constitution of 1809, and argues that this would have had a beneficial impact also on Finland, if only the country had not been conquered by Russia. Strangely enough, Häikiö conveniently forgets that the dethronement of Gustav IV Adolf, the Constitution of 1809 and the subsequent “liberal atmosphere” in Sweden were, in the first place, direct results of the war and the Russian conquest of Finland. History doesn’t take place in a vacuum; the war didn’t transform merely Finland, but also Sweden.
Leaving aside Häikiö’s personal opinions, it doesn’t take a genius to figure out the defects in his reasoning. A timeline where Finland has remained under Swedish rule implies that Sweden has either avoided the War of 1808-1809, or actually managed to emerge victorious. Thus, in both cases, the default assumption should be the perpetuation of the Gustavian absolutism as the dominant political system, so making assumptions of how the “liberal atmosphere” of the historical 19th century Sweden might have been a “better alternative” for Finland is pointless and anachronistic. In all likelihood, in an alternate timeline where Finland has remained a part of the Kingdom of Sweden, such a liberal atmosphere might not have existed at all.
Furthermore, Häikiö makes an additional mistake when he tries to argue that in his proposed timeline, Finland might have very well managed to gain her independence and separate from Sweden bloodlessly, because historically, Norway succeeded in doing the same in 1905. Häikiö’s choice of parallels is a bad one for two reasons. First, Norway was historically a separate kingdom in personal union with Sweden; Finland, however, was an integral part of Sweden, with no defined borders, with no ready political mechanisms for secession in place and with a sizable Swedish-speaking population, most of whom would have, in his suggested timeline, probably continued to identify closely with the mother country and detested any Finnish ethno-nationalism or local separatism. Second, Häikiö has once again cherry-picked the parallel which suits his argument the best and ignored another Scandinavian secession attempt which most demonstrably was not bloodless, and resulted in an outright ethnic conflict: the case of Slesvig-Holstein in 1848-1850."
Cheers,
J. J.