historioija kirjoitti:Emma-Liisa kirjoitti:historioija kirjoitti:Televisiosta kuulin, että Stalin olisi katunut Suomen jättämistä rauhaan ja sanonut syyksi Yhdysvaltain reaktion pelon. Mutta myöhemmin hän oli tajunnut liioitelleensa Yhdysvaltain ystävyydentunteita Suomea kohtaan ja päätellyt, ettei maa olisi tosiasiassa välittänyt Suomen kohtalosta mitään.
Lue Kimmo Rentolan artikkeli Historiallisessa Aikakauskirjassa 1/2001.
Onpa taas lakoninen vastaus. Pitäisi siis löytää ja muotoilla se itse.
No tässä on englanninkielinen abstrakti, jonka tein taannoin ulkomaalaiselle ystävälliseni. Vaikka kyllä sinunkin olisi syytä alkaa ede vähän vaivaa nähdä.
Kimmo Rentola: Stalin, Mannerheim ja Suomen rauhanehdot 1944 (Stalin, Mannerheim and Finland's peace terms in 1944) in Historiallinen aikakauskirja 1/2001, p. 46-61)
In Tehran 1st December 1943 Stalin presented his terms to Finland: to cut of the relations with Germany, driving away the German forces, the 19940 borders (and Hangö or rather Petchanga), the demobilization of the Finnish army and the war reparations. When the unconditional surrender has been abandoned, the Western leaders agreed, though Churchill suspected that the war reparations were too great to the Finns.
These terms were presented to Paasikivi in February in Stockholm and after that in Moscow, but the Finnish government and Parliament refused to accept them.
In June, the great Soviet offensive began in the Isthmus. The Soviets demander surrender, but Finland asked help from Germany and fought, so the SU returned to the old terms and the interim peace was concluded in September.
New documents found in Soviet archives show that it wasn’t as simple as that.
The Soviets were angered by the Western press that wrote that Finland wasn’t guilty of war. The Soviet foreign ministry concluded that 1) the activation of the Western press aimed to save Finland from “final destruction” and to prevent the Soviet to dictate Finland such terms that would undermine the American and British interests in Finland. 2) the Americans were before all interested to preserve the independence and territorial integrity of Finland, therefore they had long had diplomatic relations with Finland 3) the British who were symbolically at war with Finland were suspected to use this to preserve their interests in Finland as a buffer to prevent Communism from spreading to Europe.
Stalin’s tactics was that the British were given information only scarcely, so they couldn't have done anything if Stalin had put a fait accompli in front of them. Even if Stalin had in Tehran promised that Finland would keep its independence with the 1940 borders (but adding "if the Finns doesn't force us...”), he used every opportunity to get more.
In the end of the spring negotiations 1944 Molotov gave seven peace terms. The war reparations of 600 million dollars was claimed to be a half of those damage Finland had caused to the SU. In fact, it was calculated on the basis of the Finnish export and ability to pay. The Finns had now disadvantage of paying its debts to the USA.
The British weren’t contented with the war reparations. They regarded the sum of 600 million dollars too much to a small country like Finland, but before all they feared that “the Soviet Union would get all forests from Finland and leave nothing the British”.
Molotov stressed that seven terms were the minimum. Explaining to Paasikivi why he talked about “the interim peace” and not about peace like in 1940, Molotov said the interim peace permits that when the final peace will be made, there could be more conditions.
Indeed, Stalin had in reserve new terms which he didn't show as yet: the islands of Sveaborg just in front of Helsinki to rent for the naval base, a naval base in Åland, full railroad connections to Sveaborg (i.e. to Helsinki), Åland and Hangö, .and "correction" to the 1940 border (Lappeenranta-Imatra).
In April a new version of the peace terms was written: the demobilization of the Finnish army to 50 % until certain date (which was left open) and full mobilization to the another date, in addition to Sveaborg, Kotka's Haapasaari and Porkkala to rent (Hangö and Åland left out). The "fascist" organizations (the Civil Guards, Lotta Svärd and others") to be dissolved. The fortifications to be disposed. Also the "correction" of the 1940 frontier was mentioned.
Rentola stresses (liked Apunen and Wolff) that the Soviets had hoped that “Walden or someone else close to Mannerheim” would have been in the spring delegation. Only then the military terms could have be discussed in earnest, before all what to do with the Germans. Staffan Söderholm (the Swedish Foreign Ministry) had told the Soviet embassy in Stockholm that in Finland it was hoped for meeting between Mannerheim and Stalin. From this, Stalin understood that the way to peace went via Mannerheim.
(Earlier, the codenamame "Silinteri" (= Eero A. Wuori) had told the Soviets that the Finnish officers weren’t Nazis, at least not Heinrichs. Also Walden belonged to the more reasonable men in the government, he was close to Mannerheim and supported the treaty with the Soviets. As the Finnish people felt no enmity towards the Germans, Finland couldn’t go to war against them unless they began it. This was believed in Moscow because information was from the back door.)
As for the demand to surrender, Rentola thinks that there were two reasons to it: Soviet relations with their Western allies and the government crisis in Helsinki.
The Soviets were worried about the American reactions. They had f.ex. got an American intelligence report about the US plans of the post-war policy towards Finland ("Treatment of Finland"). According to it, though Finland wasn't guilty of war, it was now on the loosing side and had to face a period of transition when the Soviet interests would be dominant. The Finnish people had yet a chance to independence, its own government dominant and culture. The US main target was an independent Finland with good relations with the SU. The 1940 borders would be OK (with Pechanga) but no more, even a smaller Finland would be better than if it was incorporated into the SU. More important than the borders would be that the social system. of Finland would be preserved (unlike in Germany and its satellites) and Finland would remain in the control of the democratic powers. All this worried the Soviets because the showed that the USA clearly favoured an independent, democratic Finland (in the Western terms, not in Soviet ones) though with friendly relations with the SU.
This was just the time that the SU (according to document of the Soviet Foreign Ministry dated in 4th June 1944) planned to connect the Finnish economy closely with the Soviet ones: the SU would have got the dominant part in the Finnish economy (80-100 %), selling the most important materials (oil, fertilizers, raw materials of textiles) and buying the most important Finnish export products.
The demand to surrender was presented with the presupposition that it would be accepted in Finland. Moscow got from Stockholm telegrams that showed that there was panic in Helsinki. F.ex. Boheman told 19th June to Kollontay that Finland was changing its government which at once would ask for peace from Moscow. Boheman told Kollontay 22nd June (falsely) that Gripenberg had announced that the new government under Ramsay was formed and its task is to ask for peace in any terms. Soon after this, Boheman gave Kollontay an announcement of Gripenberg that Finland was ready cut off the realtions with Germany and make a pece with the SU. Boheman told that there wasn't yet a new government in Helsinki but it would be made after an answer from Moscow.
It was as an answer to these and other information like this, that Molotov presented his demand to surrender. It seemed to the Soviets that there was complete chaos in Helsinki and the Finns could be made terrify to surrender.
The moods in Helsinki were without doubt dark and irresolute but nevertheless not like Stockholm and Moscow believed. To Rentola, it is unknown if it was Boheman or Kolontay who colored information,. without knowing the result. Gripenberg was claimed to have said "in any terms”.
After noticing the mistake (the Finns were terrified, but asked help from Germany), Stalin dismissed the demand of surrender, having already had a bad experience in Hungary. After the Soviet offensive had stopped, Stalin also dismissed the plans in the "refugee government" in Stockholm and wanted to negotiate peace with "steadfast and trustworthy" Mannerheim.
The peace terms were made 21st July under the commission of Marshal Voroshilov who had reason not to like Finland for his own poor performance in the Winter War had destroyed his reputation as a front-line commander. However, it wasn’t a question of the private revenge for the commission consisted of representatives of military, intelligence and diplomacy and all were good as knowing and guessing how Stalin would think.
The terms were severe but without demand to surrender (though the word was used in the title). The bases were now Kotka's fortification area and Haapasaari, Porkkala, Hangö with the fortification area in Hankoniemi. In addition, so long there is war, the Soviet forces had right to occupy the fortification area in Helsinki, Åland, Turku, Oulu and Tornio.The new border was Kymijoki, like in the peace 1743. This would have meant 250 000 refugees (not 100 000 like I somewhere earlier said) more and crippled the Finnish economy (much materials of the paper industry, harbours, traffic lines). The war reparations remained 600 million dollars, but to please the British who needed the product of the Finnish forest industry, the SU was willing to have f.ex. products of the metal industry.
Fortunately to Finland, Stalin dismissed Voroshilov's proposal. The war reparations went down to 300 million dollars because of the pressure of the Western allies (thougjh, as it later turned out, with 1938 prices, so the sum in fact remained the same). Because of Mannerheim, the conditions how to treat the German soldiers were made less hard.
Why did Stalin show such a common sense? The answer can according to Rentola be conclued by noticing to whom the concessions were made: to the Western powers and Mannerheim.
The Western front rolled in August toward Paris and Brussels and many believed that the war would be over before Christmas. The Soviets had with the West many great matters on making (Dumabarton Oaks, Bretton Woods, the occupation zones in Germany). The rising in Warshaw had harmed the relations between the SU and the Western allies. Stalin saw that the case of Poland must even in the future advocated with hardness, which would harm the relations with the West. In that situation, so there was no need to make Finland another subject of contention but take what according to Tehran could be taken. One couldn’t have a new border in Kymijoki as the Americans got stuck to the 1940 borders though Eden perhaps would have accepted more.
The another factor was the Finnish army couldn't be crushed with the forces that the Red army had. In order to get Kymijoki, the Red army needed more forces. It was seen in Ilomantsi where an entire Soviet division was encircled and destructed.
Vinogradov (a secretary in the Soviet embassy) hoped (via Swedish diplomats) 14th August from Finland for a swift initiation to negotiate: the Soviet conditions would be reasonable and it had no will to destroy the sovereignty of Finland. This was the base upon which the interim peace was finally made.
Mannerheim acted also in the last phase with calmness and made sure that Stalin understood what was possible regarding the German soldiers. After that, he became depressed and waited for Bolshevisation immediately because he regarded the peace terms so hard. He and the other Finnish leaders didn't know how much Moscow had already given in from its earlier aims.
From the general view, the reason was geography. From Moscow POV, Finland was aside and an island. From there one couldn't drive with tanks to Berlin.
Others matters of leadership can't be overvalued: the matters were made in forced situations, ad hoc: desperate, at loss and almost in panic, adjusting opinions, scraping resources.
In the end, the Finnish people was more decisive than the leaders. The Finnish society was far from perfect, but nevertheless the major part of the people experienced that it was their own country and worth defending. Like A Renaissance historian, Guicciardini, though himself serving the Pope, once said when Venice was again saved: because God protects republics.
When Stalin had planned the great offensive in the spring 1944, he had believed that “the Finns are no more of the same sort as in the Winter War. They waver in all respects and search for peace." But when he hit the Finns with a sledge (a reference to Stalin’s words that the Finns are so obstinate people that sense must be hit to their heads with the hammer), he had to live again his memories of the Winter War. The Finns showed that they were enough of same sort as before and this influenced on the country's future fate.
