Amiraali Miklos Horthy, Unkarin valtionhoitaja syksyyn 1944, pyrkii toki muistelmissaan hieman esittämään asiat parhain päin, mutta asiassa on mukana myös Unkarin todellisesta tilanteesta 1941 sotaan liittyen.
Valitettavasti verkossa löytyy vain engl versio
http://www.historicaltextarchive.com/bo ... d=9&cid=16
Suomeksi teos on julkaistu nimellä Muistelmat vuonna 1955.
Unkarin ja Saksan tavoitteena oli Versailles´n ja Trianonin rauhansopimusten purkaminen, mutta huom. kyseessä olivat eri sopimukset. Tämä vertautuu mielestäni Suomen tilanteeseen ja 1940 rauhan purkamiseen:
…The First World War, which they had both lost, the Treaties of Versailles and Trianon, had admittedly engendered certain similarities in the views of both countries. But Hungary and Germany had reacted differently to defeat. Opposition in Hungary was directed against the countries of the Little Entente, not against the Great Powers, from whom Hungary was hoping to obtain rectification of injustices. The Germans, on the other hand, saw in the Great Powers their oppressors.
Apart from this, the friends of Germany in Hungary, among whom I counted myself, even though I refused to relinquish the right to maintain friendly relations with other countries, had to distinguish between 'Germany' and the 'Third Reich'. The pseudo-philosophy of the National Socialists and the methods of Hitler were profoundly repugnant to me. This feeling was enhanced by the infiltration of Nazi ideology into Hungarian politics, leading to the formation of a political party(1) which aimed at the overthrow of our traditional political structure.
Seuraavassa tulee esitettyä meille tuttu erillissotateesi varsin tutunkuuloisin argumentein, vaikka Unkari olikin allekirjoittanut Kolmen vallan sopimuksen:
…
That we adhered strictly to constitutional and parliamentary institutions,
that we did not indulge in the madness of racial theory, that we did not wish to leave our Polish friends in the lurch when they were in trouble, and that we had many friendly ties, even family ties, binding us to the British and the Americans, all these were heinous crimes in Hitler's eyes. The matter was all the more complicated by the policy of the Western powers, which, by saddling us with the Treaty of Trianon had placed us in
an untenable position, nationally, economically and politically. Even after the first Vienna Accord, millions of our countrymen were still living in territories outside our borders. Our concern with their fate was a matter of self-preservation. Without our intervention, the conditions under which they lived would have become more and more restricted.
Horthy kiistää melko vahvasti Unkarin olleen liittolainen ja miten Kolmen vallan sopimus ei velvoittanut sitä hyökkäyssotaan:
Also, I must stress that there never was an alliance between Hungary and the German Reich comparable to the Triple Alliance(2) between Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy, or to the German-Italian Steel Pact(3). The Three Power Pact which Hungary joined on November 20th, 1940, obliged her only to render assistance if one of the signatories were attacked by a power not belligerent at the time of signing. Last, but not least, the following points must be taken into account. For geo-political and economic reasons,
Hungary was a necessary factor in Hitler's warfare. The manner in which Hitler dealt with countries whose railways or raw materials he needed, or whose territories he wanted, not necessarily for immediate military purposes but to prevent them falling into other hands, was shown in the cases of Denmark, Norway, Holland and Belgium. On the other hand,
we had also seen that the guarantees given by Great Britain to Poland, Rumania and Greece were of no practical value. We lacked a fulcrum on which to rest a policy other than a purely realistic one.
It is easily said that we should have preferred to engage in a hopeless struggle rather than to submit to Hitler's demands, and such a view reads well on paper. In fact, it is total nonsense. An individual can commit suicide, a whole nation cannot…
Itse sotaan liittymisen, aluksi Jugoslaviaa vastaan 1941, Horthy kuvaa näin:
As the German troops were passing through our country to their offensive bases in the Banat even before we had given an official answer to Hitler's demand, we were faced by a fait accompli. If we had not marched, a vacuum would have been created in the area of the Bácska, which had been by-passed by the Germans. The ethnic Hungarian groups in that region(1) would have been defenceless against the attacks of the Cetniks, the Serb partisans. After the First World War, the Serbs had settled large numbers of their demobilized volunteers in this region, 'Dobrovolci', mainly Montenegrins and Macedonians. These were unlikely to wait for orders to attack minorities(2).
On the other hand, we had to take into account that had we refused to comply with Hitler's request, refused, that is, to occupy the Bácska, the German Army would have felt justified in occupying that region with its own troops to safeguard its own supply routes through the 'recalcitrant' hinterland.
…
On April 24th, I was received for a short interview by Hitler at his headquarters. We discussed the military and political situation in the south-east(3). Our Minister in Moscow had recently given us unmistakable evidence of the growing tension between the German Reich and the Soviet Union. He had taken up his duties in September, 1939, upon the re-establishment of our diplomatic relations with Russia, which had been broken off when we joined the Anti-Comintern Pact. Vyshinsky(4), the acting Comissar for Foreign Affairs, had on April 12th declared to Kristóffy(5), our Minister, that the Soviet Union "could see no justification for the action of Hungary against Yugoslavia". Threatening words had been uttered to the effect that Hungary also might be in trouble one day and find herself "torn to shreds".
But Hitler too was dissatisfied with us(6). He would have liked us to take part in the Balkan War. I refused to comply with his demand by referring to the attitude of the Soviet Union. On all sides our political horizon was darkening.
…
Horthy toteaa, miten maansa johdossa esiintyi viimeiseen asti voimakasta halua pysyä puolueettomana:
We had avoided, until now, entering into full alliance with Hitler. Even after June 22nd, 1941, we tried to follow rather than co-operate. Immediately after the German attack had been launched, I received another of those hand-written notes from Hitler, which I opened as usual with a sinking heart. This one
demanded that we should declare war on the Soviet Union. At the next Cabinet meeting, the Prime Minister, Bárdossy, would not even assent to the breaking off of diplomatic relations with Moscow. He has put forward the argument that we could justify this attitude in German eyes by pointing out that our Moscow Legation would provide us with an excellent source of information. When this came to the knowledge of the German Minister, through the Press Service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, he at once called on Bárdossy and told him that breaking off diplomatic relations was the least that Berlin expected of the Hungarian Government.
On June 23rd, another Cabinet meeting was held to consider a letter from Werth(10), the Chief of the General Staff, to the Prime Minister in which an immediate declaration of war was demanded.
Rumania had already entered the war, so that Hungary risked being left behind in the race should she hesitate any longer, and, instead of
securing the whole of Transylvania, would perhaps lose even those parts of it that had been returned to her by the Vienna Accord. Bárdossy refused to be moved by this argument. He voted against a declaration of war and was supported by the other members of the Cabinet with the exception of General Gyôrffy-Bengyel(11), who was standing in for Bartha(12), the Minister of War, and spoke in his chief's name. It was decided that we should break off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union; but beyond that we would not go(13).
I sent Hitler an answer, acquainting him with our decision and pointing out that Hungary was not in a position to declare war unprovoked on the Soviet Union. Considering the weakness of the forces at our disposal and the disparity in size between the two countries, such a declaration of war would have been ludicrous.
On June 26th, I received the startling news that Kassa and Munkács had been bombed. The investigation that had been immediately set on foot showed that the attack had been made by Russian planes, according to the message sent me by Werth. Marks of a Leningrad factory had been found on bomb fragments. This constituted provocation. On June 27th an official announcement was made:
"Hungary, as a result of repeated air attacks made, contrary to international law, by the Russians upon Hungarian sovereign territory, considers herself in a state of war with the Soviet Union(14)."
I cannot, however, exculpate Bárdossy from having suppressed a telegram from our Minister in Moscow, which he received during these critical days. I heard of it for the first time three years later. On being charged with the suppression, Bárdossy reluctantly admitted it. That telegram contained a message from our Minister Kristóffy that Molotov(15) had promised us Russian support in the Transylvanian question, on condition that Hungary remained neutral. To give weight to this offer, our Legation had received permission to continue sending out coded telegrams to Budapest in the usual way for eight days after June 23rd. Moscow, moreover, energetically denied that the 'provocation' raids on Hungarian towns had been carried out by Russian planes. The promise made by Molotov to Kristóffy was, in any case, of problematical value. The Great Powers are always very generous when they are trying to involve smaller countries in their quarrels or to induce them to stay neutral, especially if the reward promised is to be made at someone else's expense.
The Moscow denial, however, was true enough. Also, the message from our Chief of the General Staff was not in accordance with the facts. I find myself forced to this bitter conclusion by information given me in 1944 by the Prime Minister's parliamentary secretary, Bárczy(16), who revealed to me the details of a plot that I could not have believed possible.
Hän jatkaa miten pommitus oli saksalaisten provokaatio, jolla saada diplomaattinen oikeutus Unkarin liittymiselle sotaan. Hänen todellinen tietämättömyytensä tai tietonsa asiasta ei ole relevanttia. Oleellista on se, että tämä muodollinen provokaatio oli tarpeen. Saksalaiset eivät siis vain määränneet Unkaria liittymään mukaan sotaan, vaan asia oli paljon mutkikkaampi. Unkarilaistulkinta oli, että maa soti omista intresseistään eikä sillä mm. ollut tavoitteita Neuvostoliiton suhteen, vaikka olikin allekirjoittaja Kolmen vallan sopimuksessa. Sama pätee luullakseni muihinkin ”liittolaisiin”.
Muistettakoon vielä, että juutalaisvainot aloitettiin Unkarissa toden teolla vasta kun Horthyn hallinto syöstiin vallasta. Tuolloin maa oli jo sotatoimialuetta.
Toisessa esimerkissä Hitler itse mm. toteaa Suomen talvisodan yhdeksi perusteluksi Barbarossalle omalle puolueelleen tuoreeltaan antamassa julistuksessa.
Engl versio:
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1941/410622a.html
Suomi ja Romania esiintyvät rinnastettuna, mutta itsenäisinä toimijoina mm. 21.6. 1941 Mussolinille osoitetussa kirjeessä:
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1941/410621a.html
England will be all the less ready for peace, for it will be able to pin its hopes on the Russian partner. Indeed, this hope must naturally even grow with the progress in preparedness of the Russian armed forces. And behind this is the mass delivery of war material from America which they hope to get in 1942.
Aside from this, Duce, it is not even certain whether shall have this time, for with so gigantic a concentration of forces on both sides—for
I also was compelled to place more and more armored units on the eastern border, also to call Finland's and Rumania's attention to the danger—there is the possibility that the shooting will start spontaneously at any moment. A withdrawal on my part would, however, entail a serious loss of prestige for us. This would be particularly unpleasant in its possible effect on Japan. I have, therefore, after constantly racking my brains, finally reached the decision to cut the noose before it can be drawn tight. I believe,
Duce, that I am hereby rendering probably the best possible service to
our joint conduct of the war this year…
…Whether or not America enters the war is a matter of indifference, inasmuch as she supports our opponent with all the power she is able to mobilize. .. I have decided under these circumstances as I already mentioned, to put an end to the hypocritical performance in the Kremlin. I assume, that is to say,
I am convinced, that Finland, and likewise Rumania, will forthwith take part in this conflict, which will ultimately free Europe, for the future also, of a great danger. …
Any desires, suggestions, and assistance of which you, Duce, wish to inform me in the contingency before us, I would request that you either communicate to me personally or have them agreed upon directly by our military authorities.
Ainakaan näissä esimerkeissä kielenkäytössä ei puhuta mitään yhdestä yhteisestä liitosta, vaan kaikki esiintyvät yksilöinä, Hitlerin ja Ducen ohjatessa Euroopan kohtaloa kahdestaan. Suomen ja Romanian liittyminen mainitaan myös itsenäisinä toimijoina. Muut on unohdettu tässä vaiheessa.
"Akselivallat"-termi oli sodan aikana tuntematon. Hitler selvästikin kohteli jokaista liittolaistaan yksilönä. Tuntuu keinotekoiselta keksiä yhteistyölle muuta suomenkielistä sanaa kuin ”liitto”, vaikka jokainen pyrki tehokkaasti omista motiiveistaan kiistämään liittolaisuutta, niin sodan aikana kuin sen jälkeenkin.